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In his path-breaking volume Remaking the Chinese City, Professor Joseph Esherick (2002, 
xi) famously complained that Western historiography of 20th-century China had been 
marred by a ‘singular focus on Shanghai’. In other words, while Shanghai’s pre-war 
history (1842-1937) was already ‘quite well understood’ thanks to an inordinately large 
number of studies, other Chinese urban centres have merely invited scant attention. A 
number of Western scholars have since shifted their gaze elsewhere in search of other 
Chinese articulations of modernity – most notably Ruth Rogaski (2004) and Frank 
Dikötter (2007). 
 
Yet a thorough examination of the history of other Chinese cities – as timely as it may be 
– cannot replace a continual robust engagement with Shanghai. This is not least because 
the vast array of materials available at the Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA) and 
Zikawei Library have been systematically catalogued only over the last few years. They 
are indispensable to understanding the city’s rise to prominence and its preponderant 
position within China’s economic modernisation process. While some Chinese and 
Western scholars (Du, 2006; Bickers 2007; Goodman 2009; Henriot 2009) have already 
addressed themselves to these newly-available materials, the latter remains relatively 
under-studied.  
 
Mainly drawing on rare early editions of the North-China Herald (NCH) held at the 
Zikawei Library, this article will highlight one aspect of Shanghai’s early treaty-port 
development; it will reprise the conventional wisdom positing that, because of its 
perceived advantageous location, Shanghai had been almost deterministically poised to 
become China’s gateway to the outside world following the First Opium War (1839-
1842). Instead, it will argue that location was significant but not sufficient of itself in 
delivering Shanghai’s economic take-off. 
 
The following passages admittedly draw much less on the vast SMA repository that on 
Herald accounts. This is because the documentary material in SMA, while invaluable to 
our understanding of Shanghai’s development after 1870, contains relatively little on the 
formative era under review here (1840s-1860s). Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) 
documents from that era are not likely to be found in great quantity elsewhere either, 
since they had been primarily stored in the British Consulate compound, which was 
gutted by fire on 23 December 1870 (Denison and Guan, 2006, 56).   
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Geography looms large in much of the classic Western scholarship on pre-war Shanghai. 
Most notably, Rhoads Murphey’s influential work (1953) all but entrenched the notion 
that ‘the physical advantages of the city’s location’ was the most important factor in its 
take-off as a treaty-port. Though tempered by more recent multi-faceted studies, the 
emphasis on geographical location is still quite pervasive in the pertinent literature. 
Indeed, Shanghai’s ‘propitious location’, its appeal as a ‘natural pivot point for trade’, or 
as ‘grand port côtier’ are discussed at considerable length in some of the best newly-
published work on the city’s history (Gamble, xii; Wasserstrom, 2009, 2; Bergère, 2002, 
32).  
 
Drawing on colonial records preserved in the UK National Archives, Linda Johnson’s 
monograph (1995) is perhaps one of the most detailed Western studies of Shanghai 
between 1840s-1860s. Interestingly enough, at least half of her book is dedicated to an 
exposition of Shanghai as an important Chinese urban centre prior to the arrival of 
British settlers (CE 1074-1840, Chapters 1-6). The exposition is, in that sense, 
emphatically China-centred, a theoretical approach first accredited to Paul Cohen (1984); 
it runs counter to the old colonial myth suggesting that Shanghai had been an 
inconsequential ‘fishing village’ before Europeans landfall turned it into a ‘model 
settlement’ (Bickers, 1999, 39-40; Wasserstrom, 2009, 21-61).  
 
Notably, Johnson (1995, 264) attributes much of the city’s dynamism after 1840 to the 
‘development of a public sphere serving public interests, independent of both British and 
Chinese governments’,  in both the British-run and Chinese-run precincts. Put baldly, her 
argument is that the city’s spectacular growth owes much to Chinese agency both before 
and after 1842, not just to European municipal administration and maritime trade.  
 
As in Johnson’s work, this article will highlight Chinese settlement in the city’s foreign 
concessions in the mid-1850s as a critical factor in their subsequent prosperity. Yet the 
analysis offered here is comparative; it is underpinned by a re-assessment of the 
significance of geographical location as compared with other possible factors ranging 
from the fundamental to the incidental. In that sense, the thematic question posed at the 
background of this study is the inverse of the one posed by Johnson: if Shanghai’s 
physical location had been so compelling, why was it not among China’s 10 biggest cities 
on the eve of European settlement? Indeed, the question almost begs itself in view of 
authoritative geo-historical surveys of the area (Xiong et al., 1999, vol. 1, 2; Henriot et al., 
1999).   
 
To be sure, given its limited temporal scope, this article cannot purport to ‘re-write 
history’ or trivialise the great significance of Shanghai’s location. It will nonetheless 
underscore that Shanghai’s location posed just as many difficulties for the first European 
settlers, and that scepticism about the future prospects of the city was initially rife partly 
for that reason. How these difficulties were subsequently overcome is a story of clearly 
institutional, technological and fiscal dimensions – it is one that remains under-studied. 
These dimensions cannot be fully treated here. But, at the very least, the following 
passages might draw greater attention to additional factors that might help explain 
Shanghai’s growth after 1842. 
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Location or Rebellion and Fiscal Breakthrough? 
 
The reasons why the British chose Shanghai as their primary military and commercial 
node in China, and negotiated for its territorial concession as part of the Nanjing Treaty 
(1842), are quite complex. The East India Company’s (EIC) explorer Hugh Hamilton 
Lindsay, and inveterate missionaries Karl Gützlaff and W.H. Medhurst’s respective 
travelogues (1843; 1833; 1838) are often cited as the most important factor in bringing 
Shanghai’s virtues to British consciousness in the 1830s, namely, on the eve of China’s 
opening up to foreign trade after centuries in which it had been confined to Canton.1
 
 
Notable too was the influence Dr William Jardine  – veteran China Hand, surgeon turned 
opium trader, Shanghai aficionado, and later Member of Parliament – exerted over the 
British foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston, in the lead-up to the first Opium War 
(Johnson, 1995, 182-185). 
Canton [Guangzhou] had become an anathema for the British by then because it was 
commonly associated with monopolistic practices by both Chinese merchant guilds (the 
Hongs) and the EIC, as well as with hostile Imperial commissioners (the Hoppos) and 
xenophobic mobs. The British had, of course, aimed at opening up other ports further 
north in order to sustain their grip on global commodity trade, and realise the potential of 
opium imports in China’s hinterland markets (Fairbank, 1953).  
 
The Nanjing Treaty of 1842, which ended the first Opium War, eventually provided for 
the opening of four such additional ports north of Canton: Xiamen [Amoy], Fuzhou, 
Ningbo and Shanghai. The few British settlers who arrived at these ports the following 
year were happy to discover that locals showed little of the ‘turbulent spirit so 
conspicuously manifested at Canton’; the northernmost port of the four, Shanghai, was 
seen as bearing great potential for trade by some, but ‘few at the time foresaw the great 
position it was ultimately to reach’ (Wright, 1908, Chp. X). 
 
In the first few years since its opening, both domestic and international trade flows via 
Shanghai were sluggish, and there was little sign of a turnaround in sight. The British, 
who were keen to uncork the Canton trade confinement, were understandably frustrated. 
On July 1844, for example, the first British Consul posted to the city, Captain George 
Balfour, demanded that the highest-ranking Qing official in the region, Taotai Gong 
Mujiu, explain why there had not been progress in domestic trade. Gong reported that 
overland tea consignments en route to Shanghai had been diverted back to Canton in 
Jiangxi. Gong then assured Balfour that he intervened with the Jiangxi sub-prefects to 
allow north-bound traffic (Johnson, 1995, 212-214). As late as 1853, Rutherford Alcock, 
the proactive British Consul who succeeded Balfour, and is often credited with turning 
around Shanghai’s lot, still described it as an ‘isolated sea-port on the coast of a vast 
Empire’ (NCH, 17 September 1853, 26). 
 
                                                 
* I wish to thank the UNSW Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences for a generous research grant that allowed 
me to conduct archival fieldwork in Shanghai (February 2009), and helped bring this article to fruition. 
1 Frederick Pigou, who was an EIC Director, noted Shanghai’s potential as early as 1756.  
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Ironically, a good deal of scepticism about the city’s future was expressed precisely 
because of its location not far from the mouth of the Huangpu River at Wusong 
[Woosung]. This was the cause of constant navigational problems in the first few decades 
after European settlement because of downstream silting. Between the 1840s and until 
the British-run municipality amassed enough fiscal revenue to launch extensive dredging 
in the 1880s, the Wusong sandbar had become synonymous with maritime hardship. The 
British Parliamentary Hansard suggests that even as late as 1874 Shanghai’s small 
foreign community (predominantly merchants and missionaries – British, French, 
American – and a few Paris and Baghdadi Jews) was hopeful that the Chinese 
government would fund the dredging of this sandbar out of its own pocket. 
 
A well-informed short history of the city, published in 1928, cast the dredging of the Bar 
in the 1880s as a veritable milestone in the city’s development: 
The accessibility of the harbour in Shanghai was rendered difficult by the shallow water over the 
outer and inner Woosung Bars. These are formed by the tidal Whang-poo [Huangpu] River 
emptying itself into the tidal estuary of the Yangtze River. The low water depth of the river bar 
varied in different months of the year from 6 feet to 13 feet 6 inches and was in the midst of a 
crossing that cut diagonally from one bank to the other of the Whang-poo River…. 
In 1863 when Robert Hart, Inspector-General of Customs, was in Shanghai, a deputation, 
representing the leading shipping firms, put before him the importance of conserving the Whang-
poo and of dredging the Woosung Bar, so as to allow the entrance of the larger ships then being 
dispatched to China. He agreed to lay the matter before The Chinese Government…. 
To all requests the answer of the Chinese Government was ‘No,’ and the Chinese Ministers 
maintained an attitude ‘even more obstructive than the obstruction of the Bar.’ It is well to 
remember that in the early days, the Chinese sometimes referred to the bar as a heaven-sent barrier 
intended to prevent war vessels of heavy draught and ironclads from entering the harbour.2
Sir Robert Hart, alongside Alcock, is conventionally credited with anchoring Shanghai as 
Britain’s primary bastion in China. Yet the very same Hart, who presided over the 
Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service (IMCS), had predicted in the early 1860s 
that steam technology and the opening of the Suez Canal would end up diverting trade 
from Shanghai even if the Bar was properly dredged:  
 
[I]n 20 years time Chinkiang [Jinjiang, Fujian] will have taken the place of Shanghai as a semi-
terminus and trans-shipment port. . .Thus looked at, as it affects and is affected by natural and 
artificial agencies now at work at the mouth of the Yangtze, the question of the Woosung Bar is 
seen to mean that dredging there may possibly be nothing more than a means of making the last 
days of Shanghai a little more comfortable than they would otherwise be; it will not prolong or 
avert the commercial death of the place, but it will make a show of vitality during its declining 
years more possible (quoted in Pott, 1928, Chp. X). 
To understand how the British-run SMC was eventually able to amass enough resources 
to transform the city’s physical setting; to remove such geographical obstructions and to 
                                                 
2 Quoted in Pott, 1928, Chp. X; on the difficulties the Bar posed for Shanghai travellers, see also Cumming, 
Wanderings in China, pp. 265-266.  
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secure its future growth as a port – scholars must first turn their mind to 1853. For, as 
indicated above, trade emanating from Shanghai had been fairly sluggish hitherto.  
 
Then, happenstance intervened: an obscure band of misfits, the Small Sword Society 
(xiaodao hui), rebelled against the local Qing authorities in Shanghai’s ‘Native City’, 
driving the Taotai’s Imperial forces out (Fang 1972; Sun 1990; CFHA 1993). The 
disruption to law and order was such that as many as 22,000 refugees escaped the walled, 
old city of Shanghai to seek refuge in the areas strung along the Yang-king-pang 
[Yangjingbang] Canal, which demarcated the border between British and French 
settlements within the concession area.   
 
J.D. Clark’s well-informed Short History of Shanghai (1921, 6-7) is one of countless pre-
war sources suggesting that this was a crucial formative event in the city’s early treaty-
port history. The unchecked wave of refugees ended, in effect, an era in which only 
Europeans and the indigenous rural population sparsely scattered along the Bund could 
reside in the concession area (1843-1852). From then on, the SMC could extract 
exorbitant fees from wealthy Chinese refugees for the smallest of municipal services. 
Similarly, European lessees of concessionary land – foreign land-ownership per se was 
never recognised by the Qing – could provide makeshift accommodation for the wealthier 
amongst the refugees at inflated prices.  
 
The Qing Imperial forces were able to recover the ‘Native City’ from Small Sword rebels 
and restore order south of the Yangjingbang by early 1855. Yet an even larger exodus of 
refugees converged on Shanghai from all over the Lower Yangzi Delta (Jiangnan) seven 
years later, as the broader Taiping Rebellion swept through the region in 1862. This 
second exodus consisted of as many as 110,000 refugees, with many carrying along their 
lifetime savings in silver bullion, then China’s primary mercantile means of payment. By 
1862, word of the foreigners’ determination to protect the concession area from both 
Qing and Rebel encroachment – as first demonstrated during the Small Sword upheaval – 
had spread far and wide; it rightly persuaded many that the concessions were the safest 
place to flee to (Johnson, 1995, 343; Lu, 1999, 36) . 
 
Other Factors: Land Grab, Customs Takeover, Consul’s’ Proactive 
Line? 
 
Once Qing forces had quashed the Small Sword rebellion in January 1855, Alcock 
feigned cooperation with Taotai orders that Chinese refugees north of the Yangjingbang 
return to the ‘Native City’. Yet, the refugees had proven such a bonanza to the municipal 
authorities that Alcock, the American Consul, Robert  C. Murphy, and the French Consul 
B. Edan, ratified in July 1854 a new set of  Land Regulations, which ran counter to the 
Taotai’s orders, and were never subsequently ratified by him. 
 
The old Land Regulations were derived from the Treaty of the Bogue (Humen tiaoyue, 
1843), which in turn supplemented the Nanjing Treaty. They provided for foreigners’ 
rights to lease land along the Bund and north of the ‘Native City’, and to maintain 
judicial autonomy therein, but precluded Chinese residency in these foreign concessions.   
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By contrast, the new Regulations (1854) meant in effect that all foreign lessees of land in 
the concession area could eventually acquire title-deeds and, equally important, that 
Chinese newcomers could rent accommodation anywhere within the concession areas. 
Before long, Chinese residents far outnumbered foreigners, and the era of segregation 
between Europeans and Chinese was consigned to a footnote in the city’s annals (Lu, 
1999, 32-35).  
 
The new Land Regulations formalised a fait accompli: between 1853-1845 many agile 
foreign lessees of concessionary land scrambled to buy out the original Chinese 
landowners in anticipation of an imminent rise in demand for housing. It seems most paid 
very little to the original landowners. So much so that on 14 January 1854, shortly before 
the new Regulations come into effect, Alcock published the following Notification in the 
NCH (14 January 1854, 94): 
 
Many applications for allotments within the limits of the land originally set apart for the residence 
of British subjects by the local authorities have been recently made. In some cases, land appears to 
have been taken over without either previous notice or reference to this office – a proceeding only 
calculated to give rise to dissensions and litigations. Her-Majesty’s Consul desires under these 
circumstances to warn the community of the necessity for great caution in any dealings for land in 
the present unsettled state of affairs at the port…To the purchase of land from Chinese at this time, 
there are two very serious objections. The one  is the impossibility of obtaining a legal title…The 
other is the virtual abeyance of the [old] Land Regulations now under the consideration of the 
higher Authorities…The sudden demand for house accommodation and more land, occasioned by 
the large influx of Chinese seeking shelter and security in the Foreign settlement…has indeed 
proved both the necessity and the difficulty of adhering to this course of action…The old 
regulations still in existence prohibit to Chinese and Foreigners alike the building or renting of 
houses within the limits for the Native population. In the draft of the new [Land regulations] all 
restriction in this particular has been omitted. 
 
Notably, the Qing loss of land rights within the concession area in the mid-1850s was 
compounded by the loss of tariff autonomy. Until the Small Sword Rebellion, the 
Chinese Customhouse in the ‘Native City’ had been responsible for collecting duties 
from junks and steamers entering city bounds. This upset many British merchants, who 
saw the Chinese Customhouse as corrupt. However, the Customhouse was deserted when 
the Small Sword rebels moved in, and no duties were collected for almost two years 
afterwards, effectively turning Shanghai into a free port and haven for smugglers.  
 
Though Alcock let British vessels evade duties during that period, he was becoming 
increasingly concerned that unbridled trade would advantage other European nations. 
Therefore, once order had been restored in the ‘Native City’, he astutely wrested control 
over duty collection from foreign vessels by offering the Taotai a share of the revenue, 
and the allurement of unburdening the local Qing bureaucracy from dealing with 
‘barbarian’ crewmen (NCH, 22 October 1853; NCH 12 November 1853).  
 
As indicated above, the British bypass of Chinese tariff autonomy, its allotment of land 
rights within the concession area, as well as the influx of rent-paying refugees all had 
sweeping fiscal implications. To better understand these, we must examine Shanghai’s 
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finances before the Small Sword Rebellion, i.e. during the era of effective segregation 
between foreigners and Chinese. 
 
A rare hand-written report pertaining to the SMC, now stored at SMA, poignantly bears 
out the Council’s difficulties in raising taxes from the small foreign with which to fund 
capital works during the era of segregation. This ‘Report of the Committee of the 
Shanghai Roads and Jetties for the Year Ending May 18th, 1852’ [sic] states: 
 
The Committee regrets having to report parties who have refused to pay Jetty Tax, and one party 
[who refused to pay] the Road Assessment…the late rain enables the Committee to point forcibly 
to the Meeting the injury done to the roads by the present system of carrying mud from the River 
to the back lots of the Settlement. The Committee are at a loss to suggest a remedy, but they feel 
convinced that so long as the present careless system continues, it will be utterly impossible to 
preserve the roads in a proper state, more especially the Bund where the mud is first 
landed…( SMA File U1-1-1293). 
 
By 1856, thousands of makeshift houses had been made for refugees along the 
Yangjingbang. Herald reports suggest that most of these were built by European realty 
speculators like Gilman Bowman & Co. (NCH 8 March 1856, 126). A Year before, the 
Taotai demanded that these ‘hovels’ be pulled down because they hindered navigation on 
the Canal, thereby obstructing Qing supply lines to the forces besieging the rebels in the 
walled city. Alcock seems to have used the Taotai’s demands as a pre-text to pressure 
Chinese owners of land adjacent to the Canal to share the rent collected from refugee 
tenants with British lessees of the same land (NCH, 20 January 1855, 101). 
 
Increasing municipal land-tax revenue and tariff-derived funds meant that law and order, 
roads and port facilities could be improved in order to stimulate trade and secure 
Shanghai’s future as the leading British bastion in China proper. In the short-term, law 
and order were most important because they entrenched Shanghai’s comparative 
advantage as an island of stability in a vast empire with an atrophying central government 
that was buffeted by rebellions and foreign encroachment. 
 
The SMC’s report for 1855 suggests that land-tax receipts from Chinese residents (3,179 
silver dollars) had exceeded by then foreign receipts ($2,249). The great bulk of 
municipal revenue ($11,728) was derived from wharfage fees – but here the distinction 
between Chinese junks and ocean-going western vessels is impossible to pare down. 
Notably, of a total expenditure of $ 20,520 – over half was spent on police procurement 
and wages, and only $7,000 on new roads and jetties. Overall the SMC could conclude its 
performance that year on an upbeat note:  
 
The Council are happy to report that a material change for the better has taken place [in the 
Settlement]…In addition to the improvement arising from increased jetty accommodation; more 
extended and better made thoroughfares, and from a more complete system of drains, the streets 
have been lighted and kept almost entirely free from beggars, and the nuisances of various kinds 
by which, formerly, foreigners were so seriously inconvenienced. The Chinese buildings on the 
Yang-king-pang have been removed…[and the area] covered with native hovels, is now in the 
occupation of foreigners, while a period seems to have been put to the erection of buildings for the 
accommodation of Chinese in other quarters, and it is probable that ere long, a portion of the 
tenements which were so hastily constructed during the siege of the city will be abandoned by 
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their present occupants: a step which cannot fail to contribute materially to the cleanliness and 
salubrity of the place...( NCH, 19 January 1856, 99). 
 
Chinese studies often portray a ‘violent and crafty usurpation’ (haoduo qiaoqu) of rights 
from Chinese landowners in the foreign concession as part of a British imperialist grand 
design (e.g. Zhang, 1996, 41). It is nevertheless important to note that the end of 
segregation between Europeans and Chinese was not welcomed by all Europeans in the 
settlement. Some members of the small European community in Shanghai, who were less 
associated with mercantile and realty interests, expressed grave concerns about the influx 
of refugees. They feared that a Chinese majority in the settlement would impinge on its 
flimsy infrastructure and compromise hygiene and etiquette standards.  
 
One anonymous letter that is representative of this vein was published in the NCH (25 
May 1856, 170):    
 
The admission of Chinese residents into our settlement, although attended with pecuniary 
advantages to many, is in other respects and annoyance...[due to the] imperfect drainage of 
native houses (not that our own are by any means perfect) and the system of allowing all drains 
to run on to the roads or ditches on the road side… 
 
However, these were merely minority voices in the larger sweep of events. 
 
The Situation in Other Ports 
 
The previous section highlighted 1853 as a turning point in Shanghai’s development 
trajectory. In order to understand 1853 in context, one must take account of what 
happened in other parts of China at the same time, particularly developments in the four 
other ports opened to trade following the Nanjing Treaty.  
 
Recent work by Professor Xiong Yuezhi (1999, vol. 1) and other Chinese scholars (e.g. 
Dai, 1998, 12-17) draws out three important factors attending Shanghai’s rise. First, the 
wealthy Jiangnan gentry began gravitating toward Shanghai after the Small Sword 
Rebellion. They viewed Shanghai as a haven of stability that was largely free of Imperial 
bureaucratic exactions common in more established urban centers like Suzhou. Second, 
Shanghai’s large Chinese mercantile population had incorporated many migrants from 
various parts of China long before Europeans arrived. At the grass-roots, it was a very 
heterogenic society, and therefore much less suspicious of foreigners. Third, Late-Qing 
monarchs relinquished grand public works, to the extent that the Great Canal – once 
China’s arterial waterway – progressively fell into disrepair. This occasioned a shift of 
domestic trade toward the coastline, benefiting hitherto marginal county-level towns like 
Shanghai.  
 
While the Small Sword and Taiping effect on Jiangnan’s gentry has been discussed at 
length above, the ways in which late-Imperial inertia precipitated a shift in domestic trade 
routes await more detailed research. For now, the shift lacks clear-cut documentary 
support in either PRC or Western studies. On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence 
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to bear out the second factor, namely, the accommodating nature of Shanghai’s migrant 
society. 
 
In the preamble to his wonderfully animated portrayal of plebeian life in Shanghai, 
Professor Lu Hanchao has pointed to a number of contemporaneous testimonials to that 
effect. He thus concluded (1999, 37-38): ‘Although the rise of modern Shanghai must be 
explained from a multi-faceted analysis – including the favourable geographical location 
of the city, sitting as it does in the middle of the nation’s lengthy coastline facing the 
Pacific to the east and the Yangzi Valley to the west – the “soft” nature of the 
Shanghainese no doubt played an important role.’  
 
Evidence can be easily found elsewhere too.  In 1908, for example, veteran China-hand, 
Arnold Wright (1908, Chp. X), observed: 
 
The successful and entirely harmonious establishment of the [Shanghai European] settlement 
was…in a considerable measure due to the cordial relationship which existed between the British 
and the Chinese authorities [there]…The native population also were very friendly…Moreover, 
the inhabitants were naturally of a more peaceful type than the turbulent Cantonese with whom the 
foreign element had formerly mainly had to deal. 
 
However, Wright (1908, Chp. X) was also quick to note that, initially, the  
 
…dull and apathetic character of the natives of the place disqualified them from the bustle and 
energy inseparable from European commerce. At the end of the first year of its history as an open 
port [1843] Shanghai counted only 23 foreign residents…only 44 foreign vessels had arrived 
during the same period.  
 
The comparatively low degree of xenophobia in Shanghai, insofar as it constituted an 
advantage over other ports, should not be overstated. Ningbo was another one of the five 
ports opened after the first Opium War. In 1857, a NCH (31 March 1857, 106) dispatch 
from Ningbo exclaimed that ‘…at no one of the five ports are the natives more friendly 
than [here]’. 
 
Similarly, there was much to recommend Fuzhou as an alternative port to either Canton 
or Shanghai. Fuzhou loomed larger in important mid-1830s accounts: the EIC’s China 
Director, Sir James Urmston, who analysed the future prospects of Britain’s trade there, 
underscored ‘Foo-chow-fu’ as an ideal port because of its proximity to the tea growing 
areas of Fujian province, while eliding any mention of Shanghai altogether.   
 
When surveying the Lower Yangtze, Urmston, like many of his contemporaries, was 
much more engrossed in the adjacent island of Zhoushan [Chusan]. The latter had a 
convenient deep-water port, where the EIC had ephemerally traded in mid-18th century. 
Urmston similarly commended the commercial potential of Ningbo, a ‘large and 
populous city of the first class’.3
                                                 
3 Urmston, 1834, p. 64; cf. Medhurst’s 1838 account (368-369) where “Shang-hae” is described as ‘a city 
of the third-rank  [yet] one of the greatest emporiums of commerce on the east coast of China. It 
communicates, immediately, with the rich districts of Soo-chow [Suzhou], and Hang-chow [Hangzhou], 
 Britain, it should be remembered, occupied Zhoushan 
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during the first Opium war precisely because many thought it would prove an ideal 
location for trade; it was reluctantly traded off for another island, Hong Kong, as part of 
the Nanjing Treaty. Either way, memories of Lindsay’s effusive 1834 account of 
Shanghai carried the day with the British naval force eventually deciding to penetrate 
further inland and storm the ’Native City’ in 1842.4
 
 
As the first European settlers soon realized, the Shanghainese were less versed in foreign 
trade than their Southern compatriots. A Herald editorial from 1854 lamented the 
‘prejudices’ of Shanghai ‘natives’, who insisted that foreign merchants pay for Chinese 
commodities in full-bodied and increasingly scarce Spanish-American (Carolus) silver 
dollars. By contrast, in Fuzhou, often-adulterated Mexican dollars, which European 
merchants could obtain more easily, were accepted by the Chinese ‘with equal felicity’. 
This meant Chinese tea was made 25% more expensive for Europeans to purchase in 
Shanghai than in Fuzhou (NCH, 17 June 1854, 182-183).   
 
The possibility of Fuzhou eventually overtaking Shanghai as Britain’s gateway to China 
persisted even later that decade. In 1856, for example, a Shanghai merchant anonymously 
complained to the Herald that maritime trade in Fuzhou was not regulated by the local 
Chinese authorities, whereas in Shanghai duties were being strictly enforced by the 
newly-established British-run IMCS. This meant that tea consignments were being 
diverted from Shanghai to Fuzhou, whence they could be exported overseas. Summing up 
the implications of this loophole, the merchant soliloquised: 
 
Is the Black Tea trade fast leaving Shanghai, and are there influences at work which threaten to 
deprive us even of Green Tea?...It is to Foochow [Fuzhou] we must look for the injury our trade 
has already sustained…The ancient trade at Canton may indeed somewhat revive, but our superior 
geographical position…[should] remove all serious apprehension…Foochow however enjoys 
advantages which can neither be gainsaid nor overcome…Teas [can] be conveyed to Foochow at 
an expense of at least 15 percent less than if conveyed to Shanghai …( NCH, 5 April, 1856, 142). 
 
For this high-minded Shanghai merchant, the solution was not a revocation of the IMCS 
or a return to the unrecorded trade and contraband phase which followed the Small Sword 
Rebellion. Rather, he demanded that the other four ports also embrace IMCS regulation – 
a course of action followed, indeed, soon afterwards. He deemed such institutionalised 
abrogation of Chinese tariff autonomy necessary, because ‘China bound itself by treaty to 
levy certain duties at all the ports alike…[but] ten years’ experience has proved the utter 
inability of a purely Chinese establishment to effect this end – such is the indifference, 
imbecility and corruption of the race’. 
                                                                                                                                                 
receiving the rich brocades from that arcadia of China, and conveying thither, the inventions and 
commodities of the western world.’ 
4 On the impact of Lindsay’s account on British policy-makers like Lord Palmerston, see e.g. London 
Times Editorial, 28 March 1836, p. 4; See also Denison and Guang, 1999, 32-33; the British relinquishment 
of Chusan had to do with rumours that the Qing Court would formally cede the island to the French as part 
of their strategy of pitting ‘barbarians’ against other ‘barbarians’. The British decided to retreat from the 
island in return for Chinese indemnity, and a promise Chusan would not be ceded to any other European 
Power. Nonetheless, for many years afterwards, some in the British foreign office believed trading Chusan 
for a ‘barren rock’ such as Hong Kong had been a grave mistake. For a detailed account, see Beasley, 1995, 
55-59.  
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The IMCS aside, there are complex reasons why Fuzhou eventually remained a marginal 
port compared with Shanghai and Guangzhou. Suffice it to say here that Fuzhou (as well 
as Xiamen) had derived some of their importance during the 1880s not just from tea 
exports but also from the Taiwanese sugar trade, as well as from rapidly expanding 
maritime links with overseas Chinese trading communities in Southeast Asia.5
 
 However, 
these were severely curtailed after Japan occupied Taiwan in 1895.  
As for Ningbo, international trade going through that port was ‘dull’ right from the outset 
despite Urmston’s prognosis. The main factor here is not that Ningbo was in any way at a 
location inferior to Shanghai’s. If anything, Ningbo proffered better deep-water access, 
was closer to some silk growing areas and was the hometown of many of Shanghai’s 
prominent Chinese merchants (Jones 1974; Jones 1976; Brook 1990).  
 
Ningbo’s falling-behind probably had a lot more to do with the fact that Alcock 
politically entrenched Shanghai as Britain’s most important bastion in China, and was 
seen as the most able of the British Consuls by far. This meant that most British gunboats 
in East Asia continued to dock in Shanghai by default, so that the city was perceived by 
Chinese and foreigners alike as the safest of the five open ports. In addition, Alcock’s 
espousal of the IMCS meant that, in addition to its small mercantile and missionary 
community, Shanghai’s foreign settlement began attracting a bureaucratic workforce as 
of the mid-1850s. Thus, a complex set of circumstances – a fiscal windfall, consular 
proactivity, vigorous law enforcement, takeover of tariffs, land-rights grab as well as a 
good deal of happenstance – all add up to geography in explaining Shanghai rise to 
prominence.   
 
Alcock’s consular proactivity is perhaps the most difficult to capture in comparative 
terms. It can perhaps be best described in reference to how the Taiping Rebellion was 
handled – the Taipings having been perceived as a much more ominous threat to the 
foreign community that the Small Swordsmen. The British maintained neutrality in the 
conflict, though European arms dealers and mercenaries served both the Qing and the 
Rebels. When the Taipings approached the ‘Native City’ in February 1862, French 
gunboats repelled the ‘sanguinary wretches’ with Alcock’s support (NCH 22 February 
1862, 31). Yet, a few months earlier, when the much smaller foreign community at 
Ningbo had besought Alcock’s help in confronting the Taipings, he evaded their pleas. 
                                                 
5 Lindsay (1834, 12-13) described Amoy as a ‘celebrated emporium’ or a ‘flourishing town’ that was 
situated in ‘one of the most barren [districts] in China…it is dependent on the neighbouring island of 
Formosa [Taiwan]…’. He was more upbeat about Fuzhou (57-58): ‘…in point of local and commercial 
advantages, few cities of the empire are more favourably situated than Fuh Chow…Fuh Chow is also a far 
more central situation than Canton for the distribution of British woollen manufactures, which would also 
be here in greater request from the coldness of the climate. In the latter point, however, some of the more 
northern ports, such as Ning-po or Shang-hae, have much greater advantages than Fuh Chow’;  Lindsay 
concluded (290-291) that expectations that his mission would be allowed to trade were building up the 
further north it sailed. In Ningbo, local mandarins for the first time even promised him that he would be 
able to trade upon arrival in Shanghai. Yet, in Shanghai – the northernmost port-of-call – he was snubbed 
again. 
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Consequently, Ningbo was brutally run over (dispatches from Ningbo in NCH 15 June 




This article suggested that some aspects of Shanghai’s history may still be somewhat 
misunderstood despite an explosion of pertinent studies in recent years, and amid a 
burgeoning tendency in Western historiography of late imperial China to shift the focus 
of attention onto other parts of the country.  
 
The primary aspect explored here was the geographical one, namely, the degree to which 
its location at the mouth of the Yangzi River accounts for Shanghai’s rapid early treaty-
port development. Shanghai’s location was framed as one of a number of important 
factors that laid the groundwork for the city’s rise to prominence as of the 1880s. While 
leaving the subsequent era of urban growth to future research, the article did underscore 
fiscal expansion and Alcock’s consular proactivity in the 1860s as two factors that merit 
scholars’ closer attention. By way of counter-factual argumentation, the article then 
showed Shanghai’s location had posed at first as many obstacles to development as 
advantages. Zhoushan, Ningbo and Fuzhou had offered equally – if not more compelling 
– advantageous geographical features. 
 
To begin with, trade had been the lifeblood of the British Empire, and its stewards quite 
naturally sought to expand it into China’s interior. For centuries, Britain’s China trade 
had been confined to Canton and monopolised by the EIC. The dissolution of the EIC’s 
monopoly in 1834 impelled many to eye northern ports closer to the fabled Yangtze Delta, 
where much of China’s wealth and commodities were produced. Steam technology and 
superior military capability enabled the British to impose on Imperial China the opening 
up of four additional ports following the first Opium War. 
 
Few Britons had heard of Shanghai in the 1830s. However, Lindsay’s Amherst mission – 
one of the last to explore the North-China coast ports prior to the Opium War – had much 
praise for Shanghai’s potential, to the extent that HM Government eventually traded off 
its interest in Zhoushan for Shanghai (and Hong Kong) around the Nanjing Treaty 
negotiating table.  
 
That being the case, Shanghai still had to vie with Fuzhou and Canton for mercantile 
supremacy. It gained the upper hand not only by virtue of its location further up the coast 
but because of its sound institutional foundation, which was underpinned by a broader 
fiscal base, comprising hundreds of thousands of wealthy Jiangnan Chinese. These were, 
in turn, drawn to Shanghai’s foreign settlement because of its demonstrable immunity to 
late-imperial upheavals.  
 
In that sense, an efficient municipal police backed up by gunboat deterrence was an 
essential prerequisite for early development. So was Sino-Foreign co-habitation. Upon 
this solid foundation, the British-run settlement could later improve road infrastructure 
and port facilities, paving the way for industrialisation by the turn of the 19th century. But 
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what if the British had insisted on Zhoushan? Or if the great bulk of their naval force had 
permanently cast anchor in Ningbo rather than Shanghai in 1843? The end result might 
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